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AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD 




Firms interested in being perceived by all stakeholders and society as drivers of CSR 
activities, especially regarding CSR reporting, should have boards of directors that defend not 
only shareholder interests, but also all stakeholders’ needs. Thus, we expect that efficient 
boards, particularly if well-structured, will impact on CSR disclosure. As a result, in this 
paper, we examine the effect of board composition, particularly board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality and CSR board committee, on CSR 
reporting. Using a sample of international firms, concretely 13,178 observations belonging to 
39 countries, we hypothesize that all these attributes positively affect CSR disclosure, except 
board independence and CEO duality, which are expected to impact negatively. These 
hypotheses are theoretically supported by the agency and stakeholder perspectives. Our 
findings support all the hypotheses, except that of CEO duality, and, therefore, we conclude 
that board characteristics such as board size, board gender diversity and CSR board 
committees encourage the disclosure of CSR matters, while board independence discourages 
this reporting. Contrary to our predictions, CEO duality has a positive effect on CSR 
reporting. This paper offers empirical evidence for the agency and stakeholders approaches at 
the international level for the board attributes that contribute to a better CSR disclosure. In 
this regard, our evidence suggests that more investigation on other human capital’s 
characteristics of independent directors such as expertise or background need to be addressed.  
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AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD 
ATTRIBUTES AND THE DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES 
1. Introduction  
Within the context of organizational governance, the disclosure of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) information allows firms to maintain close relations with all stakeholders 
and to be perceived by society as actors committed to CSR matters (e.g., Simpson and 
Kohers, 2002). In this way, firms can signal to society that they are interested in meeting the 
expectations and needs of shareholders and all stakeholders (Arvidsson, 2010), because the 
disclosure of social and environmental issues may be useful for decreasing agency problems 
and information costs in capital markets, enhancing companies’ reputation and increasing 
stock values, among others (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jizi, 2017).  
Decisions such as allocating resources to companies, CSR commitment to 
stakeholders and society, maintaining a company’s relations with all stakeholders and CSR 
strategic actions, among others, are made by boards of directors. These decisions may result 
in a more sustainable business. Therefore, as Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) suggest, 
efficient boards will be likely to support CSR reporting when it is in the company’s interest to 
signal to all stakeholders and society that they are committed to their needs. In addition, 
societal pressure also may drive boards to engage with all stakeholders and, consequently, 
boards may encourage the reporting of CSR issues.  
Hence, boards of directors can play a relevant role in enhancing the transparency of 
firms by increasing the voluntary reporting of CSR information. According to prior research, 
the efficiency of boards in encouraging CSR reporting, in maintaining good relations with all 
stakeholders, in creating firm performance and in satisfying all stakeholders’ needs, among 
others, depends on their composition (e.g., De-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2015). In this 
regard, Jamali, Safieddine, and Rabbath (2008) support the idea that board structure is a key 
element in organizational decision making regarding CSR disclosure. The composition of 
boards is chosen mainly to defend shareholders’ interests, but it is also assumed that efficient 
boards will satisfy and attend to all stakeholders’ needs (e.g., Guest, 2009).  
There is a good amount of previous research that examines corporate governance and 
CSR reporting in a separate way, but empirical evidence is scarce when we focus on the effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms such as boards of directors, particularly their 
composition, and CSR disclosure (e.g., Chan, Watson, and Woodliff, 2014; Jain and Jamali, 
4	
	
2016). Thus, in this analysis we examine how board structure, particularly board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality and CSR board committee impact CSR 
reporting in a sample of international companies.  
Our paper shows that certain board attributes affect CSR reporting. Concretely, we 
find that board size, board gender diversity and CSR board committees have a positive effect 
on CSR disclosure, while board independence is negatively associated with CSR reporting. 
CEO duality shows a positive association with CSR disclosure, contrary to our expectations. 
Accordingly, this paper contributes to previous empirical literature in several ways. First, our 
results find that most board characteristics positively influence the disclosure of CSR matters, 
but others do so negatively and, therefore, firms should make up their boards with the 
appropriate attributes in order to be active in reporting CSR issues. If companies are 
interested in signaling to society that they are involved with CSR activities, the composition 
of their boards should be characterized by a large size, heterogeneity in gender, with CEO 
duality and a CSR committee. In contrast, having more independent directors on boards 
discourages the reporting of CSR matters. Thus, firms must think about the inclusion of 
independent directors on boards if they want to be perceived by society as a driver of CSR 
matters. In this case, it would be recommendable to consider a low presence of independent 
directors on boards. Secondly, we evidence that board composition, particularly certain 
characteristics, can be a relevant corporate governance mechanism that drives firms to engage 
with shareholders and all stakeholders in terms of enhancing transparency with the reporting 
of CSR information. Finally, our findings also reinforce the thesis that female directors on 
boards result in firms with a greater social and environmental commitment. Female leadership 
style differs from that of men, and women directors tend to be more ethical, more sensitive to 
social and environmental matters and more democratic, among other things, and, 
consequently, they are more likely to support policies to disclose CSR information. Thus, 
board gender diversity also becomes an important firm governance driver encouraging the 
disclosure of CSR issues.  
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the theoretical 
background and hypotheses are provided. In the third section, we present the empirical 
design, where the sample and variables are described. In the fourth section, the findings are 






2. Theoretical background and hypotheses  
Agency perspective is the most prominent theory used to examine the association 
between corporate governance, such as board attributes, and CSR reporting (e.g., Jain and 
Jamali, 2016; Sundarasen, Je-Yen, and Rajangam, 2016). The relationship between 
shareholders and managers triggers agency problems due to the information asymmetries 
between them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the board of directors becomes a 
corporate governance mechanism for shareholders to mitigate agency costs and to align 
management and shareholder interests, but boards also take into account all stakeholder 
interests affected by management decisions (Jain and Jamali, 2016). Jamali et al. (2008) also 
show that the board of directors is a relevant tool for supporting CSR matters. Bear, Rahman, 
and Post (2010, p. 209) state that “in order to exercise its monitoring function the board needs 
the appropriate mix of experience and capabilities to evaluate management and assess 
business strategies and their impact on CSR”. Thus, some board attributes may promote CSR 
disclosure (Rao and Tilt, 2016) as a way of reducing information asymmetry and, 
consequently, decreasing agency costs.  
In this regard, some prior research (e.g., Chen and Jaggi, 2001; Said, Zainuddin, and 
Haron, 2009; Khan, 2010; Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, and Ruiz, 2012; Rao, Tilt, and Lester, 
2012; Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and Stratling, 2014) shows that board independence, board 
diversity (including board gender diversity), CEO duality, board size and board committees 
such as audit committees, among others, positively affect financial, CSR and environmental 
disclosure. On the other hand, Eng and Mark (2003) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007), for 
instance, find that board independence and CEO duality have a negative effect on non-
mandatory reporting, respectively. Hence, although the evidence regarding the relationship 
between board characteristics and CSR matters is mixed, most prior evidence seems 
predominantly to report a positive association between them (Rao and Tilt, 2016).  
Additionally, the stakeholder approach is one of the most prominent theories used by 
researchers for examining the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
disclosure (e.g., Huang and Kung, 2010; Montiel and Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). The 
stakeholder perspective extends the agency perspective since stakeholder theory argues that 
the board of directors not only preserves the interests of shareholders, but also the interests of 
all stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). The relations between firms and stakeholders legitimize the 
latter to be considered in the decision-making process of firms and, as a result, boards should 
represent several stakeholders’ interests. The management team may not be interested in CSR 
issues owing to personal benefits and interests, and this type of behavior is in detriment to 
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shareholders and all stakeholders. Thus, stakeholder theory posits that the boards of directors 
are effective monitoring mechanisms for protecting all stakeholders’ interests and, therefore, 
they will be effective in getting the management team involved with CSR matters.  
In this regard, stakeholders will expect companies to report on CSR issues in order to 
reduce information asymmetries and in order to evaluate the firm’s engagement with CSR 
matters. According to Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin (2007), if stakeholders perceive that 
companies are not engaged with CSR issues, they may pressure them to disclose CSR 
information. Additionally, by reporting CSR matters, firms may garner a better reputation and 
identity (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Chan, Watson, and Woodliff, 2014). Thus, boards of directors, 
particularly their attributes, will be key to pressuring the management team to disclose CSR 
matters. In this way, boards can allow companies to behave in a way that satisfies all 
stakeholders’ interests (e.g., De Graaf and Stoelhorst, 2009).  
Therefore, in what follows we analyze the relationship between certain board 
attributes, concretely board size, board independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality 
and CSR board committee and CSR reporting, drawing on agency and stakeholder theories.  
 
Board size  
Corporate disclosure is a strategic decision to be considered by the board. The 
monitoring, controlling and reporting of companies are affected by board size. According to 
group dynamics, boards with few members will be more efficient and effective at supervising 
and monitoring managers than boards with more members. Small boards will result in better 
coordination and communication between directors and a higher accountability and 
engagement of all board directors as individuals (Dey, 2008). Nevertheless, John and Senbet 
(1998) argue that small boards also have shortcomings, since individual directors will have 
more tasks and responsibilities and, therefore, the controlling and supervising role and ability 
of board directors may be restricted. Furthermore, as Guest (2009) suggests, boards with few 
members may lack diverse expertise, which would negatively affect the controlling and 
advisory roles of the board. Given that CSR disclosure requires a workload, it is expected that 
this question will be considered on boards.  
Large boards may benefit firms in several ways, such as providing increases in firm 
value (Kalsie and Shrivastav, 2016) or a higher quality of financial reporting (Obigbemi, 
Omolehinwa, Mukoro, Ben-Caleb, and Olusanmi, 2016), among others. Thus, one of the 
attributes that makes boards effective in the sense of pressuring the management team to 
disclose CSR issues is their size (Jizi et al., 2014). This idea is supported by the stakeholder 
7	
	
perspective, which posits that big boards not only represent the shareholders’ interests, but 
also the interests of the rest of the stakeholders. Thus, the pressure of diverse sensibilities 
represented on boards may force managers to report CSR information. Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) also support the thesis that big boards are more likely to have 
directors with different kinds of experience and capabilities, which will be helpful for solving 
conflicts and making decisions, such as disclosing CSR matters.  
Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan, and Aerts (2010) show that board size enhances corporate 
governance reporting, mitigating information asymmetry and, consequently, agency costs. 
This finding suggests that board size is an attribute that contributes to voluntarily disclosing 
information such as CSR, reducing agency problems between shareholders and managers and 
aligning their interests.  
Although there is mixed evidence as to the association between board size and CSR 
disclosure, most of previous research shows a positive relationship. In this regard, authors 
such as Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006), Frías-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza, and García-
Sánchez (2013), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), Jizi et al. (2014), García-Meca and Pucheta-
Martínez (2017) and Jizi (2017) find that large boards positively influence CSR reporting.  
 Based on above arguments, we posit the following hypothesis: 
H1: Board size of firms is positively associated with CSR reporting  
 
Board independence 
 Board independence is another board attribute that has an impact on CSR disclosure. 
Board independence is a relevant corporate governance mechanism for controlling and 
monitoring the management team and for safeguarding shareholders’ interests, particularly 
minority shareholders’ interests (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Additionally, Rodríguez-
Ariza, Frías-Aceituno, and García-Rubio (2014) argue that independent directors will be 
expected to make decisions to ensure that firms achieve their aims and behave adequately 
from an independent, external and objective perspective, which will result in a higher quantity 
and quality of information disclosure. In this regard, prior research (e.g., Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez, and Garcia-Sanchez, 2009) finds a 
positive relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure.  
 However, independent board members are mainly appointed for their financial 
expertise, according to Fligstein (1991), as well as for their professional background and good 
reputation, among other things, and do not have any commercial or investment relation with 
the firm and its shareholders. Their financial knowledge allows them to assess financial 
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information better than other kinds of information such as CSR. Keasey and Hudson (2002) 
argue that independent directors can assess managers’ actions and detect and solve problems 
arising from managers’ behavior should they have industry knowledge of firms and the 
appropriate expertise, and Reeb and Zhao (2013) show that an effective reporting quality 
depends on whether the independent directors meet the aforesaid capabilities. Additionally, 
these directors may be dominated by CEOs and their role in monitoring the management team 
and obtaining external resources might be put at risk (Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2012). 
In this case, independent directors might discourage companies from voluntarily reporting 
information on matters such as CSR. Authors such as Eng and Mak (2003), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005), Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow (2007), Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) 
and Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), among others, find that board independence has a negative 
effect on voluntary disclosures, including CSR disclosure.  
Therefore, based on above arguments, we predict that board independence negatively 
affects CSR reporting. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) demonstrate that the 
disclosure of CSR issues such as greenhouse gases emissions may benefit all stakeholders, but 
can be contrary to shareholders’ interests. Thus, independent directors will be less likely to 
support the reporting of CSR matters in order to protect the interests of shareholders. In this 
sense, we posit the following hypothesis:  
H2: Board independence of firms is negatively associated with CSR reporting  
 
Board gender diversity 
Board gender diversity has received growing attention within corporate governance 
(Carrasco and Laffarga, 2007). Research suggests that female directors play a relevant role in 
enhancing board effectiveness and shows the positive impact of board gender diversity on 
improving the quality of financial information and fostering good corporate practices, among 
other things (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, and Olcina-Sempere, 2016; Rogelberg and 
Rumery, 1996).  
Agency theory argues that a female leadership style might foster the disclosure of CSR 
issues and, consequently, female directors may be good drivers of CSR matters. In this regard, 
male and female leadership styles are different since women leaders are more sensitive, 
sympathetic and caring than men directors, implying that women directors tend to be more 
likely to cooperate (Kim, 2013). Bird and Brush (2002), Davis, Capobianco, and Kraus (2010) 
and Melero (2011) propose that female directors are more democratic than males in the 
decision-making process, their orientation towards interpersonal relations is higher and they 
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are able to motivate a company’s employees better. Evidence provided by Nielsen and Huse 
(2010) and Matsa and Miller (2013), among others, suggests that women leaders are more 
attentive and sensitive to stakeholders’ demands, especially to social and environmental 
matters, showing more effective leadership in the corporate environment. In this sense, 
according to Evans (2010), communication, multi-tasking and active listening are relevant 
abilities of female directors, allowing them to bring together shareholders in the decision-
making process.  
Psychological, sociological and cognitive perspectives posit that women directors 
affect corporate governance and significant firm decisions. Prior research (e.g., Levi, Li, and 
Zhang, 2014; Man and Wong, 2013) finds that women directors are more adverse towards 
risk, more conservative and more prudent than men directors when making important 
decisions. These qualities show that female directors have more social and ethical abilities 
than male directors and behave in a more responsible way and, therefore, will be able to align 
both managers’ and shareholders’ interests and make relevant firm decisions, such as 
disclosing CSR issues.  
Drawing on the stakeholder approach, society may perceive that firms are engaging 
with CSR matters when they include women directors on boards, which also signals to society 
that firms are oriented towards stakeholders (e.g., Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994). Furthermore, 
this perspective also argues that women directors on boards may encourage CSR reporting 
because they are more-open minded than men, ensuring the support of stakeholders’ interests, 
and because they are more capable of taking steps to get firms to become more environmental 
and socially engaged and also more democratic (Hillman, Cannella, and Harris, 2002; 
Larrieta-Rubín de Celis, Velasco-Balmaseda, Fernández de Bobadilla, Alonso-Almeida, and 
Intxaurburu-Clemente, 2015). In this regard, Rao et al. (2012) evidence that heterogeneous 
boards encourage CSR reporting. Similar findings are reported by authors such as Barako and 
Brown (2008), Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, and Ruiz-Blanco (2012, 2014), Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013), Lone, Ali, and Khan (2016) and Tamini and Sebastianelli (2017), among 
others, who find a positive association between board gender diversity and CSR, or 
environmental, social and governance disclosure.  
According to above arguments, female directors’ more social and environmentally 
oriented attitude and sensitivity, as well as other characteristics of their leadership style, may 
mean that they are more likely to influence other directors to become more engaged with 
social and environmental matters, thus increasing the reporting of CSR information. 
Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis: 
10	
	
H3: Board gender diversity of firms is positively associated with CSR reporting  
 
CEO duality 
CEO duality refers to the situation when the CEO (management) also holds the 
position of chairman (control) of the board of directors, such that CEO duality results in an 
intensification of managerial power (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Surroca and Tribo, 2008).  
The effect of CEO duality on CSR disclosure has been examined in past research, 
providing contradictory findings. Consistent with agency theory, it is likely that managers’ 
personal interests will affect their commitment to CSR practices and disclosure. Thus, the 
managerial power of CEO duality may encourage the management team to re-evaluate CSR 
activities, if it perceives that they are not valuable. In this regard, CEO duality might mitigate 
the effectiveness of the monitoring role of directors, may restrict the transparency to 
shareholders and all stakeholders (e.g., Giannarakis, 2014; Sundarasen et al., 2016) and may 
constrain the execution of certain governance roles, such as CSR disclosure. Inside directors 
may be influenced by a CEO-chairman, supporting decisions against shareholders’ interests, 
because insiders do not wish to confront the CEO-chairman. For this reason, CEO duality 
might have a negative effect on CSR reporting since managers, including the CEO, may use 
CSR activities to their own benefit and contrary to shareholders’ and stakeholders’ needs and 
interests. Authors such as Chau and Gray (2010) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) show the 
negative impact of a Chair-CEO figure on a company’s transparency since it decreases 
voluntary disclosures, including CSR information. 
Conversely, CEO duality, as Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) argue, may also be 
effective by playing an important supervising role. When CEOs also hold the position of chair 
of the board they might be interested in encouraging CSR reporting since it signals to society 
and stakeholders their engagement with CSR issues. As a consequence, the CEOs’ reputation, 
tenure and legitimation by society may improve as well as they become more successful and 
might be rewarded through higher compensation. Along this line, Jiraporn and Chintrakarn 
(2013) argue that when CEO duality exists, CEOs use CSR disclosure as an opportunistic 
instrument to enhance their reputation. Additionally, CEOs may support CSR reporting 
because it may help them avoid the pressure of dominant stakeholders and may decrease 
monitoring by boards, capital markets or legislators (Jizi et al., 2014). Prior research (Jiraporn 
and Chintrakarn, 2013; Mallin, Michelon, and Raggi, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014) reports the 
positive association between CEO duality and CSR reporting, which supports the idea that 
CEO duality is not always harmful. Tamini and Sebastianelli (2017) also find that CEO 
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duality on boards increases the disclosure of more environmental-social-governance 
information and, therefore, this results in firms being more transparent. Additionally, Pathan 
(2009) and Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) suggest that when CEOs also hold the position 
of chair of the board, this situation may positively affect the disclosure of CSR matters, which 
would be carried out to defend human capital that may be threatened by investors interested in 
gaining profitability in the short term, and in order to handle risk not only with financial and 
investment strategies, but also with CSR strategies.  
Based on above perspectives, although the evidence on the association between CEO 
duality and CSR disclosure is mixed, most of prior research supports a negative effect of CEO 
duality on CSR reporting. Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis:  
H4: CEO duality on boards is negatively associated with CSR reporting  
 
CSR board committee  
Board committees such as CSR committees have become an important matter within 
corporate governance and the CSR field since they may enhance CSR policies. Through CSR 
board committees, firms signal their concerns with their environmental and social reputation 
and, consequently, setting up CSR committees with board directors should result in more 
engagement in providing an improved CSR quality (Wahyuni, Rankin, and Windsor, 2009; 
Adnan, Staden, and Hay, 2010). Drawing on the stakeholder approach, it can be said that 
companies that create CSR board committees are supporting boards interested in satisfying 
stakeholder’s needs and interests concerning the socially responsible behavior of firms and 
are providing guarantees to shareholders and all stakeholders on accountability issues (Dias, 
Rodrigues and Craig, 2017). 
CSR committees are expected to be comprised of experts in CSR issues and, therefore, 
their directors may better supervise all matters relative to CSR practices. Efficient CSR 
committees will be expected to increase company transparency by disclosing CSR 
information. Thus, they show more engagement and more accountability with CSR strategies 
and policies.  
Vigneau, Humphreys, and Moon (2015) and Fuente, García-Sánchez, and Lozano 
(2017) find that the most important purpose of CSR board committees is to report CSR 
information, since greater transparency is a significant attribute. Consistent with this idea, 
Arena, Bozzolan, and Michelon (2015) suggest that boards with CSR committees are relevant 
corporate governance mechanisms in companies because they perform an important role in 
providing a better environmental performance for all stakeholders. Hence, in line with 
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Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), the quantity and quality of CSR reporting is positively 
affected by CSR board committees.  
Furthermore, Kent and Monem (2008) demonstrate that an environmental or 
sustainable development committee such as CSR committee improves Triple Bottom Line 
(TBL) reporting. Fuente et al. (2017) provide evidence that CSR board committees are 
positively associated with a higher company transparency concerning sustainability and 
Konadu (2017) shows that the presence of a CSR committee on the board increases the 
voluntary disclosure of environmental information.  
According to the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: A CSR board committee of firm’s boards is positively associated with CSR 
reporting  
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample description 
The sample for the panel data analysis was taken from an initial population of 16,696 
observations for the period 2004-2015. Then, following the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silane, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), financial companies were excluded due to the different 
ownership characteristics, which means they are not comparable to other firms. Financial 
companies carry out particular accounting practices that make it more difficult to compare 
their financial statements with those of companies in other business activities, since they are 
not homogeneous. Therefore, the final sample consists of a total of 13,178 observations 
belonging to 39 countries obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, which contains 
both economic-financial and corporate social responsibility information, although it is an 
unbalanced panel data sample of companies. Arellano (2003) argues that the results obtained 
with these panels are as reliable as those obtained with balanced panels. 
Table 1 shows the frequencies by country in order to show their representativeness. 
Table 2 shows the sectors of activity to which the companies in the sample belong, following 
the TRBC economic sector classification given by Thomson Reuters and comprising 9 
activity sectors. It is a market-based sectorial classification system similar to that established 
by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 1 shows that the country with the most observations in the sample is the United 
States (with 3,625), followed by Japan with 1,789. In contrast, other countries, such as the Isle 
of Man or Macau, are less represented. With respect to sector of activity, according to Table 
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2, Industrials stands out with 2,816 observations, followed by Consumer cyclical with 2,484 
and Telecommunications Services being the least represented sector with 521 of the total 
observations in the sample. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
3.2. Dependent variable  
The dependent variable in the present research is CSR, which is measured using a 
multidimensional construct to address all the actions carried out by the different 
organizations, especially in the social and environmental fields (Carroll, 1979, Lee, Kim, Lee, 
and Li, 2012; Rupp, and Mallory, 2015). Specifically, we use the information available in the 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database to measure CSR by preparing an index obtained by the 
unweighted sum of various environmental and social items, assigning value 1 when the 
company does present information on that social or environmental aspect and 0, otherwise 
(Kolk and Pinkse 2010, Chen and Bouvain 2009, Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen, 2010, Gallego-
Álvarez and Ortas, 2017). Table 3 shows the 112 items that represent the environmental and 
social aspects of CSR. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
To obtain the multidimensional CSR construct, several areas were analyzed, such as 
environmental aspects, human rights and product liability. Within the environmental 
information presented by the companies, three major areas stand out: resource use, emissions 
and innovation. The use of resources reflects the performance and capacity of a company to 
reduce the use of materials, energy or water and that tries to find more efficient solutions to 
improve the management of the supply chain. The emissions category refers to the 
commitment and effectiveness of a company in reducing environmental emissions in 
production and operational processes. For its part, the innovation index reflects the capacity 
of a company to reduce the costs and environmental burdens of its customers, thus creating 
new market opportunities through new technologies and environmental processes or 
ecological products. Environmental aspects including many of the actions taken to protect the 
natural environment have also been considered in previous works (Liu 2010, Leire and Mont 
2010). 
The social aspects are represented in four major areas: workforce, human rights, 
community and product responsibility. Workforce measures the effectiveness of a company in 
achieving worker satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, maintaining diversity and equal 
opportunities. Human rights measures the effectiveness of a company in respecting 
fundamental human rights conventions, while Community focuses on the company's 
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commitment to being a good citizen, protecting public health and respecting business ethics. 
Product responsibility reflects the ability of a company to produce quality goods and services 
that integrate health and safety, integrity and privacy regarding customer data. All of this is 
intended to support equal opportunities and diversity, health and safety systems in the work 
procedures implemented, support for employee training and development, customer relations  
and supplier relations and the level of commitment to community or social projects 
(Tagesson, Blank, Broberg, and Collin, 2009; Young and Marais, 2012).  
 
3.3. Independent variables 
To analyze how the characteristics and composition of the board of directors affect the 
environmental and social aspects of CSR presented by international companies, we use 
several independent variables.  
One of the key aspects of corporate governance related to the board of directors is its 
size, which is usually measured considering the number of directors on the board (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003, Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). The number of directors must represent the 
interests of the organization and not of individual shareholders or interest groups. The size of 
the board of directors is one of the variables that positively influence CSR (Jizi, 2017; Jamali 
et al., 2008). The variable regarding the size of the board is defined as BODSIZE. 
The independence of the board of directors is another of the variables that we consider 
in the research. When speaking of independent directors, we are referring to the existence of 
non-executive directors who are professionals and are totally foreign to the inner workings of 
the organization and, therefore, the organization will not be able to interfere with their 
opinions (Wan-Hussin, 2009). These directors have as their main objective to preserve a good 
image vis-à-vis the outside, so they should be more interested in showing the socially 
responsible behavior of the company (Zahra and Stanton, 1988, Arora and Dharwadkar, 
2011). With respect to this variable, there is no consensus in the previous literature about how 
it influences the CSR information that companies disclose. While for some authors there is a 
positive relationship (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006), for others there is a 
negative relationship (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow, 2007; Prado-
Lorenzo and García -Sánchez, 2010). The variable that we will use to define an independent 
board will be INBODMEMBERS. 
Board diversity can improve business creativity and innovation, because different 
opinions and points of view are considered. Creativity and business innovation can improve 
because different opinions and points of view are considered (Brammer, Millington, and 
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Pavelin, 2007). In the case of gender, women play an important role and are considered to 
have great abilities to communicate, cooperate and care about the ideas and opinions of others 
(Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). From this point of view, women who participate on 
boards of directors are considered to be more sensitive to social and environmental issues 
(Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994; Marx, 2000) and may influence other members to be more 
socially responsible (Prado-Lorenzo and García-Sánchez, 2010; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 
1994). Like size, this is one of the variables that in previous research has shown a positive 
relation with social and environmental practices carried out by companies (Barako and 
Brown, 2008, Liao, Luo, and Tang, 2015). The variable that we will use to define female 
participation on the board of directors will be FMLEBOARD. 
CEO duality occurs when the positions of chairman of the board of directors and the 
chief executive of the company fall on the same person. This situation may lead to the 
development of strategies that favor the personal interests of the chief executive to the 
detriment of business interests. Therefore, some authors recommend that a separation of 
functions is more suitable, that is, that the position of chairman of the board of directors 
should not be occupied by the company's chief executive (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 
2003; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Regarding the results obtained in relation to CSR, they are 
contradictory. Some authors (Chau and Gray, 2010; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) consider 
the existence of a negative relationship, while others estimate a positive relationship (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Jizi et al., 2014). To represent CEO duality we will use the variable 
CEODUALITY. 
The establishment of committees within the board of directors can help companies to 
implement social and environmental policies. Although it is still an emerging phenomenon, 
more and more listed companies with a specific weight within their sector or country of 
operation are creating their own CSR committees. In this sense, some authors, such as Mallin 
and Michelon (2011), have found a positive relationship between the presence of this type of 
committee within the board of directors and the CSR policies carried out by companies. The 
variable used in our research to represent the CSR committees is CSRCOMMIT. 
 
3.4. Control variables 
Several control variables are also considered in this research in an attempt to avoid 
bias in the results. These control variables have been used in previous research into CSR. 
The variable SIZE represents the size of the company, and according to Fassin (2008), 
large companies are highly predisposed to adopt CSR practices, since they have the most 
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visibility and are more subject to greater public scrutiny and greater social pressure. In this 
regard, authors such as Spence (2007), Reverte (2009) and Ali et al. (2017) consider that the 
size of the company is positively related to the disclosure of their CSR practices. In contrast, 
small companies focus more on the survival of daily events and on satisfying their employees, 
treating social and environmental aspects from a more local point of view, which makes CSR 
less relevant. In addition, they are more likely to feel that full disclosure of their information 
could jeopardize their competitive position (Watson, Shrives, and Marston, 2002).  
ROA (return on assets) is the variable that we use to measure a company's 
profitability. Several previous research studies have focused on analyzing how profitability 
affects CSR, although the results obtained have not been unanimous. Liu and Anbomuzhi 
(2009) came to the conclusion that there is a relationship and that this relationship is positive. 
Ismail and Chandler (2005) also confirmed this positive relationship, arguing that it is caused 
by the fact that if managers know how to make a company profitable, they must also have a 
good knowledge and understanding of CSR, leading to new social relationships and 
environmental relations. However, other authors, such as McWilliams and Siegel (2000), 
found a negative association between the two variables, justifying this in that the financial 
resources used for CSR strategies generate a competitive disadvantage for the companies that 
promote it with respect to their competitors. 
LEVERAGE measures the risk of debt and assesses the company's capacity in terms 
of financial resources. This variable is measured by the ratio of total debt divided by total 
assets. It is important to know companies’ degree of indebtedness, since if they are in debt, 
they will not have the funds to carry out CSR practices (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Reverte, 
2009) and, therefore, if they do not perform these practices they will not make them known 
publicly or through any CSR report. 
The CAPITALINTENSITY variable is another of the characteristics that can affect the 
information presented by companies on CSR and has been used in previous studies by several 
authors, such as Kolk and Perego (2010), who found that this variable does not affect the 
voluntary adoption of sustainability assurance statements. In the specific field of CSR 
reporting, Xu and Zeng (2016) did not obtain a significant relationship between these two 
variables either, so we can conclude that capital intensity does not influence the disclosure 
made by companies about their CSR.  
Another control variable that we use is the sector of activity to which the companies 
analyzed belong. We define this variable as SECTORS. According to García-Ayuso and 
Larrinaga (2003), some sectors are more likely to report on CSR practices than others, since 
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their activities may have a greater impact on society. In this sense, authors such as Young and 
Marais (2012) think that there are sectors of activity that are considered to be of high impact 
for stakeholders, among which are basic materials, industrials, utilities or nor-cyclic consumer 
goods and services. In this case, companies belonging to these sectors of activity will be more 
likely to disclose CSR information to stakeholders. Finally, we also control for firm and year 
fixed effects. 
 
3.5. Econometric analysis model  
In order to test the hypotheses indicated above, a dependency model based on linear 
regressions was used for panel data. The use of panel data regression models allows CSR to 
be assessed over time by analyzing observations of several consecutive years for the same 
sample of companies. In addition, the study is enriched by taking into account the temporal 
dimension of the data. Thus, this methodology will also allow us to control the effects that 
CSR practices can undergo over different periods of time, providing the analysis with a 
certain degree of dynamism and achieving greater consistency and better explanatory power. 
Finally, the panel data regression models will allow us to obtain more information on the 
same parameter, which will lead to greater efficiency (Hsiao, 2007). 
The model posited is thus as follows: 
CSR = f (Board structure composition, size, ROA, leverage, capitalintensity, 
activity sectors) 
 
The model can be empirically estimated using the following equation.  
CSRit = β0 + β1BODSIZEit+ β2INBODMEMBERSit+ β3FMLEBOARDit+ β4 
CEODUALITYit+ β5 CSRCOMMITit+ β6 SIZEit +β7ROAit +β8LEVERAGEit 
+β9CAPITALINTENSITYit +β10SECTORSik + ηi + µit  
 
Where: 
CSRit is the dependent variable of the model and represents the information on social and 
environmental issues that companies report in period i and at time t; BODSIZEit is a numeric 
variable that represents the total number of board members; INBODMEMBERSit is a 
numerical variable that represents the percentage of independent directors on the board of 
directors; FMLEBOARDit represents the percentage of women on the board of directors; 
CEODUALITYit is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Chair of the board of 
directors and the CEO are the same person and 0, otherwise; CSRCOMMITit is a dummy 
18	
	
variable that takes a value of 1 if the board of directors has a CSR committee and 0, 
otherwise; SIZEit represents the size of the company and is measured by the log of total assets 
of the company; ROAit is the economic profitability of a company measured as the ratio 
between operating income and total assets; LEVERAGEit is the leverage ratio of a company 
computed as the ratio between its total debt and assets; CAPITALINTENSITYit represents 
capital intensity and is measured by the ratio of long-term or fixed assets over total assets; 
SECTORSik is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company belongs to sector k and 
0, otherwise. The sectors considered in this research are: basic materials, consumer cyclical, 
consumer non-cyclical, energy, industrials, technology, telecommunications services and 
utilities (healthcare is the baseline case for sector dummies).  
In all of these variables, subscript i represents the company and t refers to the time 
period. β represents the different regression coefficients and the parameters that are to be 
estimated. The random error term (Ԑit) is divided into two parts: µit, which varies among 
companies over time, and the individual effect ηi, which characterizes each company, but is 
invariant over time. 
Finally, the econometric methodology in this case must take into account that the 
dependent variable takes values between 0 and 112. The most appropriate methodology is the 
Tobit model for panel data, because it allows us to consider a dependent variable with limits 
on the right and left, as is the case of the dependent variable. The Tobit model provides 
coefficients using the maximum likelihood method. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive analysis  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics related to the variables used in the research. 
The mean of the dependent variable CSR shows that the companies disclose a mean amount 
of information on social and environmental aspects of 28.35 over a range of 0 to 112, so it 
follows that international companies still do not disclose much information on social and 
environmental aspects. Regarding the size of the board of directors measured by BODSIZE, 
the average number of members belonging to a board is 10.89 directors. On the other hand, 
the number of members of the board of directors that are independent is approximately 63%. 
The descriptive statistics also reveal that the number of women on the boards of directors is 
approximately 12%. In 29.87% of the companies, the chairman of the board of directors and 
the chief executive are the same person and 58.68% of the boards of directors have a 
committee to implement CSR policies. The average size of the companies, measured by the 
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log of total assets, is 9.64, the company average economic profitability is 6.44% and the 
leverage, on average, is 1.29% 
A correlation matrix was also created. For the sake of brevity, the matrix is not 
provided, but none of the correlation coefficients provides a value greater than 0.8. Thus, we 
can affirm that there are no multicollinearity problems.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 5 shows the results obtained from the models proposed to test the hypotheses 
posited in the research, considering that they were estimated using the Tobit methodology for 
panel data. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
One of the independent variables is BODSIZE, which has a positive effect on the CSR 
variable with a confidence level of 99%. This result shows that larger boards favor CSR 
practices, as proposed in our hypothesis H1, which we therefore accept. The results obtained 
are in line with what was previously suggested by different authors such as Jizi (2017) and 
Jamali et al. (2008), who showed that board size is one of the variables that positively 
influence CSR reporting. The argument for this relation is that large boards of directors are 
able to collect and process information in a timely manner, ensuring an appropriate 
adjustment between the company and its environment (Zahra, 1989). In the same line of 
argument, Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) argue that companies must have large 
boards of directors that allow them to bring together different managers with diverse skills 
and experience that will be of great usefulness in resolving conflicts and making decisions. 
One of these is to carry out CSR practices and report on them. 
The independence of the board of directors is another of the independent variables that 
we consider in the research and that we represent by INBODMEMBERS. In this case, it 
turned out to be statistically significant with a confidence level of 95% and with the same sign 
that had been predicted in the proposed hypothesis and, therefore, we also accept H2. This is 
one of the variables giving rise to most controversies in the previous literature about the 
influence it has on company CSR disclosure, because although for some authors the relation 
is positive (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006), for others it is negative 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow, 2007; Prado-Lorenzo and García-
Sánchez, 2010). Our study supports this negative relation between the presence of 
independent, non-executive or external directors, and the disclosure of socially responsible 
practices by companies. A possible justification for the lack of interest that independent or 
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external directors may have in disclosing the social and environmental practices of companies 
may be a consequence of “a lack of knowledge about the costs that voluntary integration may 
have for owners” (Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2014, p.13). Authors such as Prado-Lorenzo and 
García-Sánchez (2010) observed for an environmental issue of maximum relevance, 
greenhouse gas emissions, that when companies allow a large amount of information on 
social and environmental issues to be available to different stakeholders, this may be in 
detriment to the shareholders. In this case, independent directors may oppose their disclosure 
precisely to protect and not damage the interests of such shareholders. 
The percentage of women on the boards of directors represented by the independent 
variable FMLEBOARD is positive and statistically significant at 99%, as reflected in Table 5. 
Therefore, we accept hypothesis H3, and our results coincide with the idea supported by other 
research that women who participate in boards of directors are more sensitive to social and 
environmental issues (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994; Marx, 2000) and can influence other 
members to be socially more responsible (Prado-Lorenzo and García-Sánchez, 2010; Ibrahim 
and Angelidis, 1994). Other authors also consider the participation of women on boards as 
highly relevant because they consider them to be more involved than men in social and 
environmental issues; they manage environmental risks better; and are less likely to 
compromise quality of life in exchange for material success (Williams, 2003; Liao, Luo, and 
Tang, 2015). 
Our hypothesis 4 shows a positive sign in the sense that CEODUALITY has a positive 
relationship with disclosure of CSR issues. Thus, the hypothesis H4 has to be rejected because 
we predict a negative relationship between CEO duality and CSR reporting. This means that 
even if the positions of chairman of the board of directors and the chief executive of the 
company fall on the same person, strategies will not necessarily be used that favor the 
personal interests of the chief executive to the detriment of business interests and a 
consequent decrease in interest in CSR issues. Therefore, a positive relationship between 
CEODUALITY and CSR disclosure proposed by previous authors such as Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) and Jizi et al. (2014) is confirmed. The supporters of this positive relationship assert 
that CEO duality facilitates the preparation of reports on CSR with the aim of appeasing the 
pressure of powerful stakeholders and reducing supervision, or else to increase their 
permanence in office and remuneration (Jizi, 2017). In addition, Finkelstein and D'Aveni 
(1994) acknowledge that CEO duality is not always inefficient, especially when the CSR 
disclosure is used to participate and inform about effective social and environmental 
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activities, as a way to protect human capital against short-term-oriented investors (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009). 
The establishment of CSR committees within the board of directors of the companies 
positively affects the disclosure of the CSR practices they carry out, so we accept the 
proposed H5 with a level of confidence of 99%. Mackenzie (2007) warns of the importance of 
including CSRCOMMIT to assist management in the formulation of CSR strategies and 
Shaukat, Qiu, and Trojanowski (2016) show that having this type of committee indicates a 
public recognition of the importance of environmental and social responsibilities for the 
company, known as the role of reputation. Note that although it is an emerging issue, the 
results obtained are in line with those previously obtained by other authors such as Mallin and 
Michelon (2011), who found a positive relationship between the presence of such committees 
within the board of directors and the CSR policies carried out by the companies.  
Regarding the control variables, the SIZE variable is statistically significant at a 
confidence level of 95% for all models, except when the independent variable is 
INBODMEMBERS. This result confirms what was established by previous investigations, 
such as those carried out by Fassin (2008), Spence (2007) or Reverte (2009), which show that 
large companies are highly inclined to adopt CSR practices, since large companies are the 
most visible and are more subject to greater public scrutiny and greater social pressure. ROA 
presents a statistically significant relationship at 90% for two models, although it is negative, 
and therefore we consider what was established by McWilliams and Siegel (2000), in the 
sense that the financial resources used for CSR strategies generate a competitive disadvantage 
for companies that promote it with respect to their competitors. 
LEVERAGE does not show statistical significance and, therefore, does not influence 
the performance or dissemination of CSR practices by companies. Thus, it is not observed 
that lenders show interest in the information on business performance from the social and 
environmental point of view. On the other hand, as indicated by Barnea and Rubin (2010), it 
is important to know companies’ degree of indebtedness, since if they are indebted, they will 
not have the funds to carry out CSR practices and, therefore, if they do not carry out said 
practices, they cannot be disclosed publicly or through any CSR report. 
CAPITALINTENSITY does not show statistical significance in any of the models, 
and thus the results obtained in previous studies such as those by Kolk and Perego (2010) or 
Xu and Zeng (2016) are confirmed, revealing that this variable does not affect the disclosure 
companies make in regard to their CSR. 
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With respect to SECTORS, the variable that represents the sectors of activity, it is 
important to highlight the behavior of some of them, such as basic materials, industrials, 
utilities or nor-cyclic consumer goods and services, which are statistically significant (either 
at 90%, 95% or 99%). These results confirm what was indicated by Young and Marais 
(2012), who found that there are sectors of activity that are considered as high impact for 
stakeholders, among which are basic materials, industrials, utilities or nor-cyclic consumer 
goods and services. In this case, companies belonging to these sectors of activity will be more 
likely to disclose CSR information to stakeholders. 
Finally, we have also considered the possible problems of endogeneity that may arise 
between the different variables representing board composition and the disclosure of CSR 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). To analyze the problems of endogeneity that may have arisen, 
we have run several analyses using the Tobit methodology for panel data, but lagging our 
independent variables in our regressions, in line with Hartzell and Sarks (2003) and Ozkan 
(2007), who support the use of lagged explanatory variables to alleviate possible endogeneity 
concerns. The results obtained are consistent with the core findings provided earlier and, thus, 
we can confirm that potential endogeneity is not a concern in our analysis. The results with 
lagged explanatory variables confirm the findings previously shown1. 
 
4.3. Sensibility analysis 
To provide more validity to the results obtained in the previous analysis, we proceeded 
to make a new estimation with the same Tobit methodology for panel data, but this time 
considering a new dependent variable called CSR1, which was obtained by dividing the total 
sum of each of the items by the total number of items, which is 112, thus obtaining a new 
dependent variable that oscillates between the values 0 and 1. The results are similar to those 
obtained previously, since all independent variables show a positive statistical significance 
with CSR1, except INBODMEMBERS, which is negative, in line with what was revealed in 
the base model under study2. 
 
5. Conclusions 
CSR disclosure has become a relevant tool for firms to be legitimated by society, 
particularly stakeholders. When firms report CSR matters, they aim to signal to all 
stakeholders that they are involved with social and environmental issues. However, the mere 
presence of boards in firms does not imply more CSR reporting; rather, this will depend on 
what attributes boards have. Thus, in this research study our aim was to analyze how board 
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characteristics of international firms affect CSR reporting. Concretely, we examine what 
effect board size, board independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality and CSR board 
committee have on the disclosure of CSR information.  
Our findings show that board size, board gender diversity and CSR board committees 
are positively associated with CSR reporting, while board independence has a negative impact 
on CSR disclosure. CEO duality shows a significant impact on CSR reporting, opposite to our 
predictions.  
These results may have several implications. First, our evidence suggests that board 
composition is a crucial aspect that firms should take into account when making strategic 
decisions such as CSR reporting. International firms interested in showing to all stakeholders 
and society their commitment to the reporting of CSR issues should set up boards with a high 
number of members, with women directors, with CSR committees and with CEOs also 
holding the position of chairman of the board. However, the presence of independent directors 
should be minimized since these directors, according to our findings, discourage the reporting 
of CSR information. It seems that independent directors do not play an effective role 
supervising insiders and, therefore, the strong power that regulatory bodies and corporate 
good governance codes, among others, give them to reinforce their presence on boards might 
not be justified. Firms should feel free to form their boards and in the case of independent 
directors, they should introduce the appropriate number in order to protect minority 
shareholders’ rights against dominant shareholders’ power, but not expect them to perform an 
effective monitoring role by, for instance, enhancing CSR disclosure. These ideas are 
supported by Gutiérrez and Sáez (2013) and by Le Mire and Gilligan (2013), who argue that 
regulators are paying increasing attention to the formal independence of independent 
directors, as corporate governance laws seem to conceive, but this acknowledgment is 
disappointing. Secondly, researchers should delve more deeply to find out what other 
attributes of independent directors should be considered, since their mere presence on boards 
reduces the reporting of CSR matters. The lack of an appropriate background or experience in 
CSR topics might explain this behavior, but this question needs to be examined. 
Characteristics other than expertise and skills, such as their sensitivity toward CSR issues or 
their ethics, might be tested, although it has to be acknowledged that these features are 
difficult to measure. Finally, worldwide regulatory bodies should be aware that CSR 
information should not be the object of voluntary disclosure, but rather should be compulsory 
for firms. This information is useful for current or potential investors, for capital markets and 
other stakeholders. Thus, policy-makers should take a step forward and implement laws and 
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programs that oblige firms to disclose CSR matters, given their important content for all 
business, social and environmental agents.  
Our conclusions may open new lines of research in the future. First, it would be 
interesting to examine what role independent directors could perform on boards concerning 
CSR disclosure if their abilities, skills, knowledge, expertise and background are considered. 
Finally, researchers should shed new light on how the experience and background, not only of 
independent directors, but of all directors on the board, have an impact on the CSR reporting 




1All analyses on endogeneity were carried out, although not presented in the paper for reasons of space. They can be 
requested from the authors, who will gladly provide them. 
2All analyses on sensitivity were carried out, although not presented in the paper for reasons of space. They can be requested 
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Table 1 
Number of observations by country 
Country  Observations Percentage  Cum. Country  Observations Percentage  Cum. 
Australia 817 6.2 6.2 Japan 1,789 13.58 49.47 
Austria 41 0.31 6.51 Jersey 20 0.15 49.62 
Belgium 97 0.74 7.25 Luxembourg 65 0.49 50.11 
Bermuda 15 0.11 7.36 Macau 5 0.04 50.15 
Brazil 257 1.95 9.31 Mexico 124 0.94 51.09 
Canada 1,155 8.76 18.08 Netherlands 220 1.67 52.76 
Chile 110 0.83 18.91 New Zealand 53 0.4 53.16 
China 342 2.6 21.51 Norway 70 0.53 53.7 
Czech 
Republic 8 0.06 21.57 
Papua New 
Guinea 7 0.05 53.75 
Denmark 115 0.87 22.44 Portugal 29 0.22 53.97 
Egypt 22 0.17 22.61 Russia 190 1.44 55.41 
Finland 142 1.08 23.68 South Africa 80 0.61 56.02 
France 578 4.39 28.07 Spain 211 1.6 57.62 
Germany 407 3.09 31.16 Sweden 261 1.98 59.6 
Greece 10 0.08 31.23 Switzerland 393 2.98 62.58 
Hong Kong 128 0.97 32.21 Thailand 97 0.74 63.32 
India 171 1.3 33.5 
United 
Kingdom 1,209 9.17 72.49 
Ireland; 
Republic of 175 1.33 34.83 
United States 
of America 3,625 27.51 100 
Isle of Man 1 0.01 34.84 Total  13,178 100  
Israel 6 0.05 34.88    
 












Number of observations by activity sector 
TRBC economic sector name Number of observations 
Percentage Cum. 
Basic Materials 1,851 14.05 14.05 
Consumer Cyclicals 2,484 18.85 32.9 
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 1,298 9.85 42.75 
Energy 1,313 9.96 52.71 
Healthcare 1,023 7.76 60.47 
Industrials 2,816 21.37 81.84 
Technology 1,032 7.83 89.67 
Telecommunications Services 521 3.95 93.63 
Utilities 840 6.37 100 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 








INBODMEMBERS 13178 63.28263 26.43705 
FMLEBOARD 13178 11.76378 11.02402 
CEODUALITY 13178 0.2987013 0.457706 
CSRCOMMIT 13178 0.5868459 0.4924187 
SIZE 13178 9.64261 1.477543 
ROA 13178 6.44361 8.447218 
LEVERAGE 13178 1.28872 21.70911 
CAPITALINTENSITY 13178 6.306013 5.734303 
Basic Materials 
 
13178 0.1404614 0.3474783 
Consumer cyclicals 13178 0.188496 0.3911226 
Consumer Non-
Cyclicals 
13178 0.0984975 0.2979974 
Energy 13178 0.0996358 0.2995251 
Healthcare 13178 0.0776294 0.2675976 
Industrials 13178 0.2136895 0.4099257 
Technology 13178 0.0783123 0.2686727 
Telecommunication 
services 
13178 0.0395356 0.1948728 













Multivariate analysis results 












    
INBODMEMBERS  -0.0139185** 
(0.0061487) 
   
FMLEBOARD   0.0339063*** 
(0.0099131) 
  
CEODUALITY    0.5852023*** 
(0.2034985) 
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*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01 
 
